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Abstract: This study explores small feedback-based decision problems experimentally. Conducted were 
the  experiments  in  which  the  decision-maker’s  payoff  distribution  was  limited  to  either  favorable 
distribution or unfavorable distribution. The first remarkable observation revealed complexity/loss aversion 
in  the  experiment.  The  second  observation  included  the  law  of  small  numbers.  Deviations  from 
maximization  were  also  observed.  Finally,  we  investigated  the  imperfect  Bayesian  decision-makers 
observed  in  the  experiment  by  exploring  to  what  extent  the  decision-makers  could  update  subjective 
Bayesian probability and rely on it in making decisions.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  This  study  conducts  search  experiments  on  Small 
Feedback-based  Decision  problems  (SFD).  SFD  are 
defined  as  consequential  decision  problems  but  each 
single choice is not very important because the options 
available  to  the  Decision-Maker  (DM)  have  similar 
expected  values  that  may be quite  small,  so  that  little 
time and effort is typically invested in these problems
[1]. 
The DM in SFD is supposed to make his decision many 
times without evaluating carefully the possible outcomes.   
  This  research  carries  out  extensive  experimental 
exploration of the process of Bayesian updating  with 
SFD.  There  has  been  some  literature  about  search 
experiments  on  SFD
[1,2],  none  of  this  literature  has, 
however,  focused  upon  the  process  of  Bayesian 
updating.  This  study  conducts  search  experiments 
focusing upon the DM’s sequential search process of 
Bayesian updating on SFD.   
  The current experiments were conducted with the 
repetition  of  400  rounds,  while  many  previous 
experiments
[3] focused upon one-shot description-based 
decisions.  The  reason  of  conducting  repeated-play 
conditions is that economics experiments typically use 
stationary replication, where the same task is repeated 
over and over, with fresh endowments in each period. 
Data from the last few periods of the experiments are 
typically  used  to  draw  conclusions  about  the 
equilibrium behavior outside the laboratory
[4].   
  Present  results  exhibit  the  DMs’  remarkable 
tendencies. The first remarkable observation reveals the 
DMs’ complexity/loss aversion in the experiment. The 
second is that the DMs behave as if the law of small 
numbers  is  revealed.  Deviations  from  maximization 
(low  maximization)  are  also  observed.  The  third 
observation  is  that  the  DMs  behave  as  if  they  are 
imperfect Bayesians. 
 
Bayesian updating: The standard principles adopted in 
economics  to  model  probability  judgment  under 
uncertainty  are  concepts  of  Bayesian  updating. 
Bayesian  updating  helps  us  concern  the  manner  in 
which the DM processes new information and update 
his beliefs.   
  Consider  a  game  in  which  the  following  two 
equally likely states of the world are available to the 
DM, a priori relatively high state, State A and a priori 
relatively low state, State B. Let a, b>0, p1, p1Î[0, 1], 
ap1 >b and ap2 > b. In State A, two bingo cages are 
available:  cage  H  from  which  a  ball  numbered  α  is 
drawn with probability p1; cage L a ball numbered β 
with  certainty.  In  State  B,  two  bingo  cages  are 
available:  cage  H  from  which  a  ball  numbered  α  is 
drawn with probability p2; cage L a ball numbered β 
with certainty.   
 
State A. Choose between:   
H: a points with probability p1; 0 otherwise   
L: b points with certainty. 
 
State B. Choose between:   
H: a points with probability p2; 0 otherwise   
L: b points with certainty. 
 
  At the beginning of the game, the DM is presented 
with  the  two  equally  likely  states  of  the  world 
introduced above and its payoff structure. The DM is 
asked to choose for 400 times one of the two cages, Am. J. Applied Sci., 2 (7): 1129-1133, 2005 
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cage H or cage L, from which one ball is drawn at a 
time. It is undisclosed which of the two states of the 
world is an actual state throughout the game, however, 
disclosed that the same state of the world yields draws 
over  400  trials.  Hence,  the  DM  will  be  expected  to 
discover  which  of  the  two  states  of  the  world  be 
realized actually.   
  We  explore  an  analysis  in  this  study  the 
assumption  that  the  rational  DM  should  make  his 
decision to maximize his expected payoff (utility) under 
uncertainty  This  assumption  asserts  that  the  DM  is 
willing to keep choosing H (L) after he has appeared to 
an actual state to be State A (B).   
  At  period  t,  the  DM’s  updated  probability  of 
recognizing an actual state of the world in the process of 
Bayesian updating, facing the outcome, xt, is given as:   
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t t
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  From  the  tenets  of  Bayesian  updating  and  a 
rationality  assumption,  we  propose  the  following 
important hypothesizes on the DM’s behavior. One is 
that the DM should choose an alternative H whenever 
Pt (StateA/xt ) >0.5 at period t, implying that State A is 
more  likely  to  be  an  actual  state  for  the  DM.  The 
second  hypothesis  is  that  the  DM  should  choose  an 
alternative L whenever Pt (StateA/xt ) < 0.5 at period t, 
implying that State B is more likely to be an actual state 
for the DM.   
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
  Two economics experiments, Experiment 1 and 2 
were conducted at Kyoto Sangyo University Economic 
Experiment Laboratory. Thirty-three undergraduates at 
Kyoto  Sangyo  University  participated  in  both 
Experiment 1 and 2 in order. Both Experiment 1 and 2 
were  conducted  under  the  condition  that  the  subjects 
were  informed  of  the  exact  number  of  rounds  and 
sessions  to  be  performed.  The  subjects  received 
monetary  payoffs  according  to  the  exchange  rate:  1 
point= 0.6 Yen (0.5 US cent).   
  Both  in  Experiment  1  and  2,  the  subjects  were 
asked to join four sessions, Session 1, 2, 3 and 4, each 
of which was consisted of 400 rounds (100 rounds only 
in Session 1) under the condition that the subjects were 
presented with two equally likely states of the world at 
the beginning of each session, a priori relatively high 
state (good news) and a priori relatively low state (Bad 
news). The subjects were undisclosed an actual state of 
the world during each session, however, were disclosed 
that  the  same  state  of  the  world  was  yielding  draws 
across one session. Hence, the subjects were expected 
to discover which of the two states of the world was 
actually generating each draw in each session.   
 
 
Fig. 1: Computerized money machine 
 
  Throughout both Experiment 1 and 2, the subjects 
were  instructed  to  operate  a  computerized  money 
machine shown in Fig. 1. The subjects’ basic task at 
each round was a binary choice between L and R for 
400 times in each session. The payoff structure of the 
two  buttons  is  introduced  in  the  following  section. 
Among both experiments, the money machine provided 
the subjects with binary types of feedback immediately 
following each choice: the payoff for the button chosen, 
that  appeared  on  the  screen  for  the  duration  of  one 
second  and  an  update  of  an  accumulating  payoff 
counter, which was constantly displayed.   
 
Experiment  1:  In  Experiment  1,  the  subjects  were 
provided with two equally likely states of the  world: 
State A (good news) and State B (bad news), however 
they were undisclosed that State A was a dummy state 
and therefore State B was an actual state for all of the 
four sessions. Let (V, p) be an alternative that yields a 
payoff  of  V  points  with  probability  p  and  zero 
otherwise: 
   
Session 1:  State A: Choose between L: (6, 1) and R: 
(5, 1). 
State B: Choose between L: (4, 1) and R: 
(3, 1). 
Session 2:  State A: Choose between L: (4, 0.9) and 
R: (3, 1). 
State B: Choose between L: (4, 0.8) and 
R: (3, 1). 
Session 3:  State A: Choose between L: (4, 0.3) and 
R: (3, 0.25). 
State B: Choose between L: (4, 0.2) and 
R: (3, 0.25). 
Session 4:  State A: Choose between L: (32, 0.2) and 
R: (3, 1). 
State B: Choose between L: (32, 0.1) and 
R: (3, 1). 
 
Experiment  2:  The  setting  for  Experiment  2  is  the 
same as Experiment 1 with the exception that State A Am. J. Applied Sci., 2 (7): 1129-1133, 2005 
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was an actual state for all of the four sessions and it was 
undisclosed to the subjects.   
 
Session 1:  State A: Choose between L: (4, 1) and R: 
(3, 1). 
State B: Choose between L: (2, 1) and R: 
(1, 1). 
Session 2:  State A: Choose between L: (4, 0.8) and 
R: (3, 1). 
State B: Choose between L: (4, 0.7) and 
R: (3, 1). 
Session 3:  State A: Choose between L: (4, 0.2) and 
R: (3, 0.25). 
State B: Choose between L: (4, 0.1) and 
R: (3, 0.25). 
Session 4:  State A: Choose between L: (32, 0.1) and 
R: (3, 1). 
State B: Choose between L: (32, 0.05) and 
R: (3, 1). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
  Table 1 shows the mean proportion of L choices 
(choice  L)  throughout  400  rounds  in  each  session  in 
Experiment 1 and 2. Figure 2-4 shows the choice L in 
blocks of 50 trials to facilitate an efficient summary of 
the large set of the data. On the one hand, among both 
experiments, we see that the reversed certainty effect 
was observed in Session 2 since choice L were more 
than 0.5. On the other hand, it is found that the choice L 
in  Experiment  1  was  significantly  larger  than  that  in 
Experiment  2  for  all  of  the  four  sessions.  The 
corresponding p-values are 0.491, 0.000, 0.319, 0.460 
for Session 1, 2, 3, 4 respectively.   
 
L or R starts choice: We find pronounced tendency 
that there were fewer L start choices in Experiment 2 
than  in  Experiment  1,  in  phases  where  our  subjects 
made their starting choices. The mean proportion of L 
start choices were 0.68, 0.94 and 0.65 in Session 2, 3 
and 4 in Experiment 1 respectively,  while 0.39, 0.67 
and 0.58 in Experiment 2. The difference between the 
two experiments is significant (P (Z £ z) =0. 069).   
  Regarding Session 2 in Experiment 2, there exists 
remarkable tendency that R was chosen often as starting 
choice  as  though  complexity/loss  aversion  was 
exhibited in the first trial in spite of the following two 
facts. One is that in being made the first draw, both L 
and R offers the same expected payoff if there is only 
one draw. If there is only one draw, the expected payoff 
(utility) of the two alternatives is the same:   
 
1 1
EU(L) {4 0 8} {4 0 7} 3 EU(R) 3
2 2
= ´ ´ . + ´ ´ . = , =  
 
  The second fact is that observing the outcome of 
the first R draw does not resolve uncertainty regarding 
the state of the world (good or bad news) as the first L 
draw may do.   
  Regarding Session 3 in Experiment 2, there exists a 
substantial tendency that L was chosen often as starting 
choice although L offered less expected payoff than R 
did if there was only one draw. If there is only one draw, 
the expected payoff (utility) of L is lower than R:   
 
1 1
EU(L) {4 0 2} {4 0 1} 0 6 EU(R) 0 75
2 2
= ´ ´ . + ´ ´ . = . , = . .  
 
  This  trend  is  a  mirror  image  of  complexity/loss 
aversion as in Session 2 in Experiment 2. In addition, as 
regards both Experiment 1 and 2, the proportion of L start 
choices in Session 3 was the highest of all the sessions. 
 
Table 1: The mean proportion of L choices throughout 400 rounds 
  Session 1  Session 2  Session 3  Session 4 
Experiment 1  0.944  0.56  0.76  0.52 
Experiment 2  0.94  0.54  0.5  0.46 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Choice L in blocks of 50 trials in session 2 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Choice L in blocks of 50 trials in session 3 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Choice L in blocks of 50 trials in session 4 Am. J. Applied Sci., 2 (7): 1129-1133, 2005 
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  Regarding Session 4 in Experiment 2, there exists 
tendency that more subjects, on average, started with L 
in  Session  4  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  L  offered  less 
expected payoff than R did if there was only one draw: 
   
1 1
EU(L) {32 0 1} {32 0 05} 2 4 EU(R) 3
2 2
= ´ ´ . + ´ ´ . = . , = . 
 
  One  explanation  of  this  tendency  is  that  the 
subjects were likely to overweight small probabilities at 
the beginning of Session 4. The alternative R, however, 
was  chosen  often  gradually  as  the  subjects  obtained 
binary  types  of  feedback  repeatedly  throughout  400 
rounds either in the process of “adaptive learning” or on 
account  of  the  effect  of  the  expectation  of  playing 
gambles repeatedly.   
  It is particularly interesting to focus on the DM’s 
process  of  Bayesian  updating  after  an  initial  draw  in 
Experiment  2.  One  implies  that  after  having  a 
successful outcome in the first round, an outcome of 4 
in Session 2 and 3, or 32 in Session 4, the Bayesian 
maximizes  expected  utility  DM  should  stay  with  L; 
after having an unsuccessful outcome in the first round, 
an outcome of 0 in Session 2, 3 and 4, the DM should 
switch to R. The current results show that after having a 
successful outcome in Session 2, an initial outcome of 4, 
most of the subjects (91%) updated well and preferred 
to  stay  with  L  as  the  above  hypothesis  suggests. 
Remarkably,  all  subjects  who  had  received  an  initial 
draw of 32 in Session 4 preferred to stay with L. On the 
other hand, all subjects in Session 2 and all but quite 
fewer  of  the  subjects  in  Session  4  (94%)  updated 
mistakenly and kept staying with L after receiving the 
unsuccessful outcome, an initial draw of 0.   
 
The law of small numbers: The law of small numbers 
was observed in both Experiment 1 and 2. The law of 
small numbers posits that the DM will gather too little 
data  and  over  generalize  from  small  samples  to 
distributions
[6]. Assuming that the rational DM should 
behave  to  maximize  his  expected  payoff  under 
uncertainty, the DM’s over generalization of a payoff 
distribution  may  sometimes  lead  him  to  behave 
irrationally.  In  economic  applications,  each  DM  will 
search  too  little  and  learn  too  quickly,  compared  to 
models  of  optimal  sampling  and  inference
[7].  One 
would insist that too little search leads the DM to learn 
mistakenly and  mistaken learning induces the DM to 
behave irrationally. 
  The current results indicate that the DM chose the 
alternative too little and learn mistakenly too quickly. 
Table  1,  shows  that  the  subjects  in  Session  4  in 
Experiment 2, on average, chose L only 184 out of 400 
times.  One  possible  explanation  of  this  is  that  the 
subjects might try L too little (only 184 times) and learn 
mistakenly too quickly that L had less expected payoff 
than  R.  Mistaken  learning  is  likely  to  induce  the 
subjects to choose R many times. 
Over  weighting  and  underweight  small 
probabilities: There has been some literature on salient 
properties  of  over  weighting  and  under  weighting  of 
rare  probabilities  in  both  one-shot  description-based 
decisions and (repeated) SFD. Firstly, Kahneman and 
Tversky
[3]    found  with  questionnaire-based 
experiments  that  the  average  DMs  in  one-shot 
description-based  decisions  behaved  over  weighting 
small probabilities. Most of the subjects over weighting 
generally low probabilities preferred the gamble (5000, 
with p = 0.001; 0 otherwise) over a sure payoff with the 
same  expected  payoff.  Secondly,  Barron  and  Erev
[2] 
found that the average DMs in SFD behaved as if they 
under  weighted  small  probabilities  and  most  DMs 
preferred  the  risk-less  gamble,  which  yielded  3  with 
certainty,  over  the  gamble  (32,  with  p  =  0.1;  0 
otherwise).   
  Low  maximization  rates  were  observed  in  our 
experiments except Session 1. This observation is the 
reverse  of  the  one  in  the  description-based  decision 
experiment conducted by Kahneman and Tversky
[3] . It 
is insisted that the effect of the expectation of playing 
gambles repeatedly leads to the low maximization rates 
observed  in  the  current  experiments.  Note  that 
Kahneman  and  Tversky’s  subjects  were  asked  to 
perform  choice  problem  only  once  with  exact  prior 
information on payoff structure and paid hypothetical 
payoffs;  Barron  and  Erev’s  subjects  were  asked  to 
perform choice problem 400 times repeatedly without 
any  prior  information  on  payoff  structure  and  paid 
monetary payoffs. Our results show a similar trend to 
Barron and Erev’s results indicating under weighting of 
rare  events  in  SFD,  contrary  to  one-shot 
description-based decisions. It is straightforward for the 
subjects in Session 4 in Experiment 2 to choose L often, 
revealing  deviations  from  expected  payoff  (utility) 
maximization in SFD.   
 
Imperfect Bayesians: Some of the subjects appeared to 
be imperfect Bayesians. This section explores to what 
extent  the  subject  in  Experiment  2  can  update  his 
Bayesian updated subjective probability of recognizing 
an actual state of the world in Experiment 2 (updated P) 
and rely on the DM’s updated P in making his decisions. 
This  exploration  can  be  done  technically  by 
investigating a correlation between the updated P and 
choice  L.  We  represent  in  Fig.  4  the  aggregated 
subjects’ updated P and choice L in blocks of 50 trials.   
  The current results reveal that the subjects’ mean 
updated P remained more than 0.5 after T = 1 in Session 
2,  while  after  T  =  12  in  Session  4.  One  set  of 
implications is concerned with that the maximum of 400 
trials  should  be  sufficient  for  the  DM  for  judging  an 
actual state of the world in Experiment 2 correctly. That 
is, the subject could update his posterior information that 
each draw following would be coming from State A with 
probability of more than 0.5 after choosing L at T = 1 
and T = 12 in Session 2 and 4 respectively.   Am. J. Applied Sci., 2 (7): 1129-1133, 2005 
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  The current results also reveal that the subjects, on 
average, never kept choosing L after T = 1 and T = 12 
in Session 2 and 4 respectively in spite of the fact that 
the subjects’ mean updated P remained more than 0.5 
after those periods. One implies with this result that the 
subjects  appeared  to  be  imperfect  Bayesians  and 
less-than-fully-rational  DMs  on  the  ground  of  being 
unconditional upon their updated P in forming beliefs 
over  a  state  of  the  world.  A  rationality  assumption 
asserts  that  the  perfect  Bayesian  rational  DM  should 
keep choosing L whenever his updated P are more than 
0.5 in order to maximize expected payoff (utility).   
 
Methodologies:  One  insists  that  a  SFD  experiment 
should be conducted with the condition that the choices 
and payoffs of others can be observed to each DM. In 
spite  of  the  above,  the  current  experiments  were 
actually  conducted  in  the  setting  that  each  DM  was 
informed of no information as to others’ choices and 
payoffs.  This  is  likely  setting  on  the  ground  that  in 
many routine-learning models, knowing others’ choices 
and payoffs is inessential since the DM is assumed to 
simply choose strategies that yielded high payoffs in the 
past
[6].   
  Another insists that a SFD experiment should be 
conducted  under  the  condition  that  each  DM  is 
questioned in each trial which of the two states of the 
world is the actual one to be realized. This should be to 
the point at a rough glance but we have considered it 
inappropriate settings for the current experiment due to 
the  following  reasons.  Firstly,  one  considers  it 
unreasonable  setting  that  the  DM  is  asked  to  answer 
repeated  questions,  which  are  not  experimenter’s 
primary  concerns  and  may  affect  DM’s  decision 
making  either  directly  or  indirectly.  Recall  that  the 
primary concern of our SFD experiment is not to ask 
which of the two states of the  world the DM should 
consider to make a decision in each trial, but to observe 
what alternative the DM chooses. Secondly, asking the 
DM either State A or B many times (for 1300 times in 
each  experiment)  will  take  the  DM  much  time  and 
effort  and  induce  careful  evaluation  of  the  possible 
options  in  the  DM’s  decisions.  Although  careful 
evaluation is needed in big description-based decision 
experiment, we should avoid such careful evaluation in 
SFD experiment. Lastly, the main concern in this study 
is  that  repeated  questions  in  each  trial  are  likely  to 
influence  the  DM’s  adaptive  learning  for  making  his 
optimal decision.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  We have examined decision making on SFD in a 
laboratory experiment. The DM’s search propensity has 
been explored in the context of Bayesian updating and 
some simple econometric methods have been employed 
in this study.   
  Further  research  on  a  search  under  uncertainty 
would clarify the following two issues. The first issue 
concerns to what extent the DM relies upon updated P 
in making choices. The second issue concerns to what 
extent the DM makes use of a naive heuristic in making 
choices.   
  To the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
literature, which aims at reviewing econometric studies 
on the DM’s individual search behavior in SFD that use 
data from national economies. Yet it is straightforward 
to  use  search  and  choice  models  as  maintained 
hypotheses  for  conducting  econometric  estimation. 
Hence it is hoped that further research on this type of 
decision  making  in  SFD  would  clarify  the  empirical 
validity of search theory itself.   
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